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THE APPLICATION OF PORTUGAL V.
COUNCIL: THE BANANA CASES
MARC WEISBERGER*
I.  ABSTRACT
The Courts of the European Community (EC) considered in four
recent cases the scope of the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.)
judgment in Portugal v. Council that the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement cannot be used by EC Member States as a basis
for challenging the legality of EC measures.  That is to say, the WTO
Agreement does not have ‘direct effect’ in the EC legal order.  The
four cases discussed in this Article all addressed whether individuals
could rely on WTO rules to impugn the EC’s attempts to implement
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) reports in European Communi-
ties—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas
(EC–Bananas).  The EC Courts responded in these cases by applying
Portugal v. Council.  The Courts denied the applicants the right to
challenge the relevant EC measures, even where those measures had
been ruled inconsistent with WTO rules by a panel convened under
Article 21.5 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).  This Article suggests
that the EC Courts correctly concluded that although WTO members
are under a soft international obligation to fully implement WTO
DSB reports, the express wording and structure of the DSU means
that this obligation cannot be given direct effect in the EC legal order.
II.  INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses four recent decisions of the EC Courts,
which will be collectively referred to as the Banana Cases: the Euro-
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pean Court of First Instance (C.F.I.) rulings in Cordis v. Commission,1
Bocchi Food Trade International v. Commission,2 and T Port v.
Commission3 (the Quota Damages Cases), and the judgment of the
E.C.J. in OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft (OGT).4  The Banana Cases
all arose from the EC’s legislative efforts to implement the panel and
Appellate Body reports adopted by the WTO DSB in EC–Bananas.5
This Article focuses on the sections of the decisions which con-
sider the interaction between EC law and the WTO Agreement,6
giving particular attention to the effect of adopted WTO panel and
Appellate Body reports in the Community legal order.  As a precur-
sor to this discussion, it is necessary to explain briefly Portugal v.
Council,7 on which the reasoning in the Banana Cases was based.
1. Case T-18/99, Cordis Obst und Gemüse Groβhandel GmbH v. Commission (2001),
available at http://curia.eu.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
2. Case T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v. Commission (2001), available
at http://curia.eu.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
3. Case T-52/99, T Port GmbH & Co KG v. Commission (2001), available at http://curia.
eu.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
4. Case C-307/99, OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St.
Annen (2001), available at http://curia.eu.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
5. WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report on EC Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas—Complaint by Ecuador, WT/DS27/R/ECU, 1997 WTO DS
LEXIS 11 (May 22, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/recu.wp5
(last visited Nov. 16, 2001); WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report on EC Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras,
WT/DS27/R/GTM, 1997 WTO DS LEXIS 15 (May 22, 1997), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/dispu_e/rgtm.wp5 (last visited Nov. 16, 2001); WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Body Panel Report on EC Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas—Complaint by Mexico, WT/DS27/R/MEX, 1997 WTO DS LEXIS 17 (May 22,
1997), available at http://www.wto. org/english/traop_e/dispu_e/rmex.wp5 (last visited Nov. 16,
2001); WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report on EC Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas—Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/R/USA, 1997 WTO
DS LEXIS 13 (May 22, 1997), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/rgtm.wp5 (last visited Nov. 16, 2001); WTO Ap-
pellate Body Report on EC Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/AB/R, 1997 WTO DS LEXIS 10 (Apr. 29, 1996), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/dispu_e/rgtm.wp5 (last visited Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report].
6. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
7. Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395; see generally Axel
Desmedt, European Court of Justice on the Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order,
27 LIEI 93 (2000); Stefan Griller, Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union:
Annotation to Case C-149/95, Portugal v. Council, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 441 (2000); Alan Rosas,
Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council. Judgment of the Full Court of 23 November 1999, 37
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 797 (2001); Geert A. Zonnekeyn, The Status of WTO Law in the Com-
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III.  CASES
A. Portugal v. Council
In Portugal v. Council, Portugal challenged the decision of the
Council of the European Union to conclude8 Memoranda of Under-
standing with India and Pakistan on market access for textile prod-
ucts.9  These Memoranda were negotiated and concluded following
the end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, in the context of con-
tinuing WTO textile market access discussions.  Among other com-
plaints,10 Portugal challenged the Memoranda as being inconsistent
with the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT
1994),11 the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,12 and the Agree-
ment on Import Licensing Procedures.13
munity Legal Order: Some Comments in the Light of the Portuguese Textiles Case, 25 EUR. L.
REV. 293 (2000).
8. In the context of the EC’s external relations law, “conclude” has two simultaneous
meanings.  On the one hand, the term signifies the internal EC process by which the EC institu-
tions decide that a particular agreement should be accepted by the EC.  On the other, it signifies
the international act by which the EC expresses its definitive consent to be bound.  Without the
first step, the expression of EC consent to be bound would be invalid in EC law.  Without the
second, third parties would not know whether the EC had decided to enter into the agreement
in question.  See I. MACLEOD ET AL., THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 92 (1996).
9. Council Decision 96/386/EC of 26 February 1996 Concerning the Conclusion of Memo-
randa of Understanding Between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan and Between the European Community and the Republic of India on Arrangements in the
Area of Market Access for Textile Products, 1996 O.J. (L 153) 47.
10. Portugal also alleged that Council Decision 96/386/EC breached the principle of publi-
cation of Community legislation (Portugal, Case C-149/96, ¶¶ 53–54); the principle of transpar-
ency (id. ¶¶ 55–58); the principle of cooperation in good faith in relations between the EC insti-
tutions and the EC Member States (id. ¶¶ 59–68); the principle of legitimate expectations (id.
¶¶ 69–77); the principle of non-retroactivity of legal rules (id. ¶¶ 78–82); the principle of eco-
nomic and social cohesion (id. ¶¶ 83–87); and the principle of equality between economic op-
erators (id. ¶¶ 88–93).  None of these claims was successful and the application was dismissed in
its entirety (id. ¶ 94).
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
12. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994).  The full text of the agreement is available on the WTO web-
site, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/16-tex.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
13. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994).  The full text of the agreement is available on the WTO web-
site, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/23-lic.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
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The detailed reasoning of the case will be considered below.
Most significantly, the E.C.J. held that Portugal could not rely on the
provisions of the WTO Agreement, because they were not among the
rules that could be used to challenge the legality of EC measures.14
That is to say, the Agreement was held not to have direct effect
within the EC legal order.  Unlike the EC measures considered in the
Banana Cases, those associated with the Memoranda of Understand-
ing were not the subject of proceedings under the DSU.
B. The Quota Damages Cases
1. The Original EC Rules and the WTO Challenge.  The three
Quota Damages Cases arose from amendments made to the EC rules
governing the allocation of banana import quotas in the aftermath of
EC–Bananas.15  Council Regulation 404/93,16 which established the
framework for the common organization of the EC banana market,
originally drew a distinction between bananas produced in the EC,
bananas from third countries other than African, Caribbean and Pa-
cific (ACP) states,17 “traditional” ACP bananas, and “non-
traditional” ACP bananas.  An Annex to Council Regulation 404/93
specified the quantities of bananas traditionally exported by each of
the ACP states to the EC.18  “Traditional” ACP bananas were those
that did not exceed the stated quantities, while “non-traditional”
ACP bananas were those that did.
More specifically, the Portuguese Government claimed that Council Decision 96/386/EC
was contrary to the WTO rules on four grounds.  It disputed the lawfulness of the option
granted to the Indian government to reintroduce alternative specific duties and to grant export
licenses under procedures not provided for in the WTO Agreements, on the ground that these
powers were contrary both to Article II of GATT 1994 and the provisions of the Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures.  The Portuguese Government claimed, furthermore, that the im-
balance between the commitments undertaken by the Community and those undertaken by In-
dia and Pakistan on opening up their respective textiles markets was unlawful, particularly in
respect of the option of granting requests for exceptional flexibility.  Finally, it relied on a
breach of the obligation to publish international agreements provided by Article X of GATT
1994.  Portugal, Case C-149/96, Op. Advocate Gen.,  ¶ 25.
14. Portugal, Case C-149/96, ¶ 47.
15. See cases cited supra note 5.
16. Council Regulation 404/93 of 13 February 1993 Regarding the Common Organisation
of the Market in Bananas, 1993 O.J. (L 153) 47.
17. Belize, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivorie, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Madagas-
car, Somalia, St Lucia, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines and Suriname.
18. In tons/net weight: Cote d’Ivoire 155,000; Cameroon 155,000; Suriname 38,000; Somalia
60,000; Jamaica 105,000; St Lucia 127,000; St Vincent and the Grenadines 82,000; Dominica
71,000; Belize 40,000; Cape Verde 4,800; Grenada 14,000; Madagascar 5,900.  See Council
Regulation 404/93 (Annex), 1993 O.J. (L 47) 11.
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Council Regulation 404/93 originally laid down an annual tariff
quota for third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas of 2.2 mil-
lion tons.  In turn, the annual tariff quota was divided as follows:
a) 66.5% for operators19 who had marketed third-country and/or
non-traditional ACP bananas (“Category A”);
b) 30% for operators who had marketed EC and/or traditional
ACP bananas (“Category B”);
c) 3.5% for operators established in the EC who had started mar-
keting bananas other than EC and/or traditional ACP bananas
from 1992 (“Category C”).20
Operators were to receive import licenses for bananas on the basis of
the average quantities of bananas they had sold in the last three years
for which figures were available.21
Commission Regulation 1442/9322 established detailed rules for
the issuing and administration of those import licenses.  It further
subdivided Category A and B operators into three types of qualifying
entities (“activity functions”).  The activity functions were divided be-
tween primary importer, secondary importer, and ripener.23  In order
to qualify as Category A and/or B operators, economic agents must
have performed at least one of these activities in “marketing” ba-
nanas during the above three year reference period.  Fixed percent-
ages of the licenses required to import bananas from third countries
or non-traditional ACP sources at lower duty rates within the tariff
quota were allocated on the basis of these activity functions.  Article 5
of Commission Regulation 1442/93 provided for a weighting coeffi-
cient of fifty-seven percent for primary importers, fifteen percent for
secondary importers, and twenty-eight percent for ripeners of ba-
nanas.  However, the EC regime for banana imports was impugned
successfully by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the
19. An operator was defined as a legal or natural person established in the EC who mar-
keted a minimum quantity of bananas on their own account.  See id. art. 19(1); see also Commis-
sion Regulation 1442/93 EEC of 10 June 1993 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Application
of the Arrangements for Importing Bananas into the Community, 1993 O.J. (L 142) 6, at art. 3.
20. Council Regulation 404/93, supra note 18, art. 19(1).
21. Id. art. 19(2).
22. Commission Regulation 1442/93 of 10 June 1993 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the
Application of the Arrangements for Importing Bananas into the Community, 1993 O.J. (L 142)
6.
23. Id. art 3(1).  More specifically, primary importers engaged in the purchase of green
third-country and/or ACP bananas from the producers, or where applicable, the production,
consignment and sale of such products in the EC.  Secondary importers/customs clearers acted
as owners, supplying and releasing for free circulation green bananas and selling them with a
view to their subsequent marketing in the EC.  Ripeners acted as owners, ripening green ba-
nanas and marketing them within the EC.  1993 O.J. (L 142) 7.
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United States in EC–Bananas.  The Appellate Body report ultimately
held that, inter alia:
1. The activity function rules were inconsistent with Article I:1 of
GATT 1994, as their procedural and administrative requirements
for importing third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas dif-
fered from, and went significantly beyond, those required for im-
porting traditional ACP bananas.24
2. Most of the suppliers from the complainant WTO members were
classified in Category A for the vast majority of their past mar-
keting of bananas, and most of the suppliers of EC (or ACP) ori-
gin were classified in Category B for the vast majority of their past
marketing of bananas.  Thus, the allocation of thirty percent of
the licenses allowing the importation of third-country and non-
traditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates to Category B
operators was inconsistent with Articles II and XVII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), as it created less
favorable conditions of competition for like service suppliers from
the complainant WTO members.25
3. The vast majority of the ripening capacity in the EC was owned or
controlled by natural or juridical persons of the EC and most of
the bananas produced in or imported to the EC were ripened in
EC owned or controlled ripening facilities.  On the other hand,
most of the suppliers from the complainant WTO members would
usually be able to claim reference quantities only for primary im-
portation, and possibly for secondary importation, but not for the
performance of ripening activities.  Thus, the allocation to ripen-
ers of a certain portion of Category A and B licenses allowing im-
portation of third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas at in-
quota tariff rates was inconsistent with Article XVII of the
GATS, as it created less favorable conditions of competition for
like service suppliers from the complainant WTO members.26
24. Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, ¶ 206.
25. Id. ¶ 244.
26. Id. ¶ 246.  The Appellate Body also held the following: a) the allocation of tariff quota
shares to some, but not to other, WTO members not having a substantial interest in supplying
bananas to the European Communities was inconsistent with Article XIII:1 of GATT 1994; b)
the tariff quota reallocation rules of the Banana Framework Agreement (BFA) were inconsis-
tent with Article XIII:1 of GATT 1994 and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of GATT 1994; c) the
BFA export certificate requirement was inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994; and d) the
Community practice with respect to hurricane licences was inconsistent with Article III:4 of
GATT 1994 and Articles II and XVII of the GATS).  Id.
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In light of the WTO DSU proceedings, the EC amended Council
Regulation 404/93 with Council Regulation 1637/98,27 and replaced
Commission Regulation 1442/93 with Commission Regulation
2362/98.28  The relevant rules of the revised banana import regime are
discussed in the following section.
2. The Revised Rules.29  Under the revised rules, traditional
ACP bananas were defined as those imported from twelve ACP
countries30 up to an annual aggregate limit of 857,700 tons.31  The An-
nex to Commission Regulation 2362/98 proportionately allocated a
tariff quota of 2.553 million tons for non-traditional ACP bananas32
and third-country bananas33 to Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Pan-
ama, and an “others” category (the Annexed Origins).
Traditional ACP bananas and non-traditional ACP bananas up
to 240,748 tons were duty free.34  For additional non-traditional ACP
bananas, a preferential out-of-quota duty applied.35  A duty of EUR
75 per ton was applied to up to 2.553 million tons of third-country ba-
27. Council Regulation 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 Amending Regulation 404/93 EEC on the
Common Organisation of the Market in Bananas, 1998 O.J. (L 210) 28.
28. Commission Regulation 2362/98 of 28 October 1998 Laying Down Detailed Rules for
the Implementation of Council Regulation 404/93 EEC Regarding Imports of Bananas into the
Community, 1998 O.J. (L 293) 32.
29. The EC has subsequently replaced the revised rules discussed in this section in order to
achieve a mutually satisfactory solution with the United States and Ecuador in EC–Bananas.
See Council Regulation 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 Amending Regulation 404/93 EEC on the
Common Organisation of the Market in Bananas, 2001 O.J. (L 31) 2; see also Commission
Regulation 896/2001 of 7 May 2001 Laying Down Detailed Rules for Applying Council Regula-
tion 404/93 EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 126) 6 (regarding the arrangements for importing bananas into
the Community).  The new regime entered into force on 1 July 2001.  See generally Press Re-
lease, Commission, EU Welcomes Suspension of US Sanctions Following Resolution of WTO
Banana Dispute (July 2, 2001) IP/01/930; Press Release, Commission, Commission Adopts
Regulation to End Banana Dispute (May 2, 2001) IP/01/628; Press Release, Commission, EU
and Ecuador Reach Agreement to Resolve WTO Banana Dispute (Apr. 30, 2001) IP/01/627;
Press Release, Commission, U.S. Government and European Commission Reach Agreement to
Resolve Long-Standing Banana Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001) IP/01/562; Press Release, Commission,
Statement from Pascal Lamy: The Commission and the U.S. Administration have Agreed on a
Solution to the Banana Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001) IP/01/559 (press releases on file with the Duke
Journal of Comparative and International Law).
30. See supra note 17.
31. Council Regulation 404/93, supra note 16, at art. 16(1), Annex.
32. For example, imports from traditional ACP countries over the 857,700-ton limit or
quantities supplied by ACP countries that were not traditional suppliers to the EC, such as the
Dominican Republic.  See id. art. 16(2).
33. Id. art. 18(1)(2).
34. Id. art. 18(1)(2)(3).
35. Id. art. 18(5).
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nanas.36  An out-of-quota duty applied for additional third-country
bananas exceeding 2.553 millions tons.37
The operator categories (A, B, and C) and the market activity
functions were abolished.  Instead, Commission Regulation 2362/98
divided the tariff quota and the traditional ACP quantities between
traditional operators38 and newcomers.39
Traditional operators were each to receive an annual ‘single ref-
erence quantity’ for all the Annexed Origins from the national
authorities, based on the quantities of bananas actually imported
from the Annexed Origins during a reference period.40  For imports in
1999, the reference period was 1994–1996.41
On receipt of specified import data and documentation,42 the na-
tional authorities were to determine a “provisional reference quan-
tity” for each traditional operator, on the basis of the average quanti-
ties of bananas actually imported from the Annexed Origins during
the reference period.43  The Commission was to be notified of these
provisional reference quantities.44
Using this information, and considering the overall allocation be-
tween traditional operators and newcomers, the Commission was
authorized to set a “single adjustment coefficient” which the national
authorities would apply to each traditional operator’s provisional ref-
erence quantity.45  The national authorities then were to determine
the final reference quantity for each traditional operator, applying the
Commission’s adjustment coefficient.46
36. Id. art. 18(1)(2).
37. Id. art. 15.
38. According to the regulation:
“traditional operators” shall mean economic agents established in the European
Community during the period for determining their reference quantities, and also at
the time of their registration under Article 5 below, who have actually imported a
minimum quantity of third-country and/or ACP-country bananas on their own account
for subsequent marketing in the Community during a set reference period.  The mini-
mum quantity referred to in the first paragraph shall be 100 tonnes imported in any
one year of the reference period.  This minimum quantity shall be 20 tonnes where the
imports consist entirely of bananas with a length of 10 centimetres or less.
Commission Regulation 2362/98, supra note 28, at art. 3.
39. Id. art. 7.
40. Id. art. 4(1).
41. Id. art. 4(2).
42. Id. art. 5.
43. Id. art. 6(1).
44. Id. art. 6(2).
45. Id. art. 6(3).  The Commission set an adjustment coefficient of 0.939837.
46. Id. art. 6(4).
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The applicants in the Quota Damages Cases were traditional op-
erators under Commission Regulation 2362/98.  The common feature
of the applicants in the Quota Damages Cases was that the application
of the adjustment coefficient by their respective national authorities
led to a reduction in their provisional reference quantities.47  The ap-
plicants all claimed that this reduction was unlawful.  Consequently,
they sued the Commission in actions before the C.F.I., claiming non-
contractual damages to compensate them for the financial loss they
allegedly suffered as a result of the application of the reduction coef-
ficient and the adoption of Commission Regulation 2362/98.48
3. The Judgments.  The applicants in the Quota Damages Cases
alleged that despite the Community’s response to EC–Bananas,
Commission Regulation 2362/98 still conflicted with GATT 1994,
GATS, and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  After
the close of pleadings on the Quota Damages Cases in the C.F.I.,
however, the E.C.J. delivered its judgment in Portugal v. Council,
holding that in “[r]egard to their nature and structure, the WTO
agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which
the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Com-
munity institutions.”49
Portugal v. Council establishes that EC Member States cannot
challenge the legality of Community measures for alleged conflicts
with the WTO Agreement.  That is to say, the WTO Agreement has
no direct effect in the EC legal order for Member States.  Arguably, a
fortiori, the WTO Agreement cannot have direct effect for individuals
either.50  Indeed, the applicants all conceded, in additional observa-
47. Case T-18/99, Cordis Obst und Gemüse Groβhandel GmbH v. Commission (2001), ¶
15 (adjusting 848,759 kg to 797,695 kg), available at http://curia.eu.int (last visited Nov. 16,
2001); Case T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v. Commission (2001), ¶ 18 (ad-
justing 6,660,977 kg to 6,260,233 kg), available at http://curia.eu.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2001);
Case T-52/99, T Port GmbH & Co KG v. Commission (2001), ¶ 14 (adjusting 13,709,963 kg to
12,885,130 kg), available at http://curia. eu.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
48. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ec_cons_treaty_en.pdf (last visited Nov.
16, 2001).  Article 288 of the Treaty provides that in the case of non-contractual liability, the
Community shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member
States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of
their duties.  See also Griller, supra note 7, at 470.
49. Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, ¶ 47.
50. See Honourable Nicholas Forwood QC, Judge of the C.F.I., The Status of WTO Law in
the Community Legal Order, Paper Presented at the 4th Annual Conference of the World
Trade Law Association (Nov. 10, 2000) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law).
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tions to the C.F.I., that WTO provisions did not have general direct
effect within the Community legal system.51
The applicants then attempted to re-frame their arguments as
complaints that the EC institutions, by adopting Commission Regula-
tion 2362/98, were guilty of “misuse of powers” as a matter of EC
law.52  More specifically, the applicants argued that because the EC
arrangements for banana imports had been declared incompatible
with WTO rules in the adopted panel and Appellate Body reports,
and that the EC had undertaken to rectify the infringements con-
cerned, the EC was then precluded as a matter of EC law from
adopting further provisions in breach of those rules.53  The Commis-
sion, they claimed, had deliberately infringed WTO rules in order to
achieve the organization of the banana market and had therefore
misused its powers.54
The practical consequences of this argument were obvious.  The
issue of direct effect would become irrelevant if the adoption of a
measure infringing WTO rules could be shown to be a “misuse of
power.”  The focus of judicial attention no longer would be on
whether WTO rules were sufficiently precise and unconditional to be
given direct effect.55  Instead, it would be directed towards the action
and ‘subjective’ intentions of the EC in light of its international obli-
gations.56  The C.F.I., no doubt conscious of the fact that the ‘misuse
of power’ argument thus had the effect of undermining the E.C.J.’s
ruling in Portugal v. Council, denied the applicant any relief based on
the WTO Agreement for the following reasons.
The C.F.I., in deciding the Quota Damages Cases, noted the ap-
plicants’ concessions and first applied Portugal v. Council.  The C.F.I.
held that WTO rules are not intended to confer rights on individuals,
51. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 33; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 38; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 33.
52. A misuse of powers has been defined by the E.C.J. as the adoption by an EC institution
of a measure with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or
evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of
the case.  See Case C-156/93 European Parliament v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-2019 ¶ 31.
53. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶¶ 31-37; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶¶ 36-42; T Port, Case T-52/99,
¶¶ 31-37.
54. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶¶ 31-37; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶¶ 36-42; T Port, Case T-52/99,
¶¶ 31-37.
55. See infra section IV.C.
56. See Case 6/54, Netherlands v. High Authority, 1955 E.C.R. 103, 116; Case 15/57, Com-
pagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R. 211, 230.
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and consequently that the EC cannot incur non-contractual liability
as a result of their infringement.57
In relation to the alternative ‘misuse of power’ submissions, the
C.F.I. determined that an act of an EC institution is vitiated by misuse
of powers only if it was adopted “with the exclusive or main purpose
of achieving an end other than that stated.”58  Further, it held that a
finding of misuse of powers may only be made on the basis of “objec-
tive, relevant and consistent evidence.”59  The applicants’ submission
that the Commission had adopted Commission Regulation 2362/98
“to achieve its ends, namely the organization of the market in ba-
nanas,”60 was thus fatal to their claims.  Without identifying or pro-
viding an ulterior aim behind the legitimate objective stated in the
Regulation, i.e. the detailed implementation of Council Regulation
404/93 as amended, their claim of misuse of powers could not be sub-
stantiated.61
In addition, the C.F.I. stressed that the applicants’ reliance on
misuse of powers to challenge the substance of Commission Regula-
tion 2362/98 for breach of WTO rules was ill conceived.  Misuse of
powers, according to the C.F.I., involves the EC Courts’ review of the
“purpose of a measure and not its content.”62  The C.F.I. also rejected
the argument that the EC was precluded from adopting a regulation
which infringed, or continued to infringe, WTO rules, when the EC
had previously undertaken to comply with those rules in the WTO.63
The C.F.I. held in effect that the applicants were attempting to bring
the adopted reports within the Nakajima64 and Fediol65 exceptions
identified in Portugal v. Council.  The exceptions allow the EC Courts
to review the legality of EC measures in the light of WTO rules in two
circumstances.66  In the first circumstance, the EC intends to imple-
57. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 51; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 56; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 51.
58. Case C-285/94, Italian Republic v. Commission, 3 E.C.R. I-3591 (1997).
59. Joined Cases T-551/93 and T-231/94 to T-234/94 Industrias Pesqueras Campos SA and
Transacciones Maritimas SA and Recursos Marinos SA and Makuspesca SA v. Commission, 1
E.C.R. II-247 (1997); see also Cordis, ¶ 53; Bocchi, ¶ 58; T Port, ¶ 53.
60. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 36; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 41; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 36.
61. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 54; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 59; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 54.
62. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 56; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 61; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 56.
63. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 57; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 62; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 57.
64. Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council (1991) E.C.R. I-2096.
65. Case 70/87, Fedération de l’industrie de l’huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission,
1989 E.C.R. 1781 (1991).
66. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 58; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 63; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 58.
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ment a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO.67  In
the second, the EC measure refers expressly to the precise provisions
in the WTO Agreement annexes.68
The C.F.I. refused to apply the exceptions to the adopted re-
ports, as they did not include any “special obligations” that the Com-
mission intended to implement within the meaning of Nakajima.69
Nor did they come within Fediol, as they did not “make express ref-
erence either to any specific obligations arising out of the reports of
WTO bodies, or to specific provisions of the agreements contained in
the annexes to the WTO Agreement.”70  Consequently, the C.F.I.
ruled in each case that: “The applicant cannot therefore base its ac-
tion on an alleged infringement of certain agreements contained in
Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement in this case or on an alleged misuse
of powers.”71
C. OGT72
In contrast to the private applicants in the Quota Damages Cases,
Ecuador successfully challenged the legality of the revised EC banana
import regime through a further WTO challenge.  The WTO panel in
European Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distri-
bution of Bananas–Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador73 (EC–Ba-
nanas–Article 21.5 Panel) determined that the amended EC rules re-
ferred to above continued to infringe the WTO Agreement.74  More
specifically, EC–Bananas–Article 21.5 Panel held, inter alia:
67. Nakajima, Case C-69/89, ¶ 30 held that the Community was intending to implement its
obligations under the GATT 1947 Anti Dumping Code through Commission Regulation
2423/88.  Therefore, the E.C.J. could determine whether the Council had acted in breach of the
Code by adopting the Regulation.
68. The Fediol court held that Article 2(1) and the preamble of Commission Regulation
2641/84 expressly referred to GATT 1947.  Fediol, Case 70/87, ¶ 22.  Consequently, the E.C.J.
could interpret GATT in order to rule on whether the Commission had correctly concluded that
Argentina’s conduct was not an “illicit commercial practice” within the meaning of that Regula-
tion.
69. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 59; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 64; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 59.
70. Id.
71. Cordis, Case T-18/99, ¶ 60; Bocchi, Case T-30/99, ¶ 65; T Port, Case T-52/99, ¶ 60.
72. Case C-307/99, OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St.
Annen (2001), available at http://curia.eu.int/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
73. WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report on EC Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Art. 21.5 by Ecuador, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, 1990
WTO DS LEXIS 7 (May 6, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
27rwecue.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Art. 21.5 Panel Report].
74. Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (DSU) reads: “Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a
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a) WTO members in the two groups—traditional ACP suppliers on
the one hand and non-traditional ACP and third-country suppli-
ers on the other—were not restricted similarly within the meaning
of Article XIII:1 of GATT.75  Moreover, the allocation of a collec-
tive tariff quota for traditional ACP states did not approach as
closely as possible the share which those countries might be ex-
pected to obtain in the absence of the restrictions as required by
the chapeau to Article XIII:2 of GATT.76  Therefore, the reserva-
tion of the quantity of 857,700 tons of bananas for traditional
ACP imports under the revised regime was inconsistent with
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of GATT 1994.77
b) While WTO members have a degree of discretion in choosing a
previous representative period, it was clear in this case that the
period 1994–1996 was not a “representative period.”78  Accord-
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such
dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including
wherever possible resort to the original panel.”  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
75. The Article 21.5 panel gave many examples of this dissimilar treatment; one example
was that exports under the tariff quota by third-country and non-traditional ACP suppliers were
restricted, in aggregate, to 240,748 tons, whereas traditional ACP suppliers were restricted, in
aggregate, to 857,700 tons.  Art. 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 73, ¶ 6.26.
76. The chapeau to GATT 1994 Article XIII:2 reads: “In applying import restrictions to
any product, Members shall aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely
as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of
such restrictions.”  GATT 1994, supra note 11, at art. XIII:2.  Article XIII:2(d) requires that the
allocation of shares within a tariff quota be based on proportions during a representative period.
Id.  The EC chose 1994–1996 as the representative period.  However, the Article 21.5 panel
found that traditional ACP average exports in that period were only about eighty percent of the
857,700 tons reserved for traditional ACP imports.  Art. 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 73, at ¶
6.28.  On the other hand, the tariff quota of 2,553,000 tons for non-traditional ACP and third-
country bananas had run at over ninety-five percent utilization since its creation (and there had
been some out-of-quota imports).  Id.  Thus, the Article 21.5 panel concluded that the EC re-
gime did not clearly aim at the requisite distribution of trade under the chapeau to Article
XIII:2.  Id.
77. Art. 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 73, ¶ 6.29.
78. Article XIII:2(d) provides that if a WTO member decides to allocate a tariff quota it
may seek agreement on the allocation of shares in the quota with those members having a sub-
stantial interest in supplying the product concerned.  In the absence of such an agreement, the
member
shall allot to Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares
based upon the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous representa-
tive period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being
taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in
the product.
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ingly, the country-specific allocations assigned by the EC to Ec-
uador, as well as to the other named Annexed Origins, were not
consistent with the requirements of Article XIII:2 of GATT
1994.79
c) It was not reasonable for the EC to conclude that Protocol 5 of
the Lomé Convention80 required a collective allocation for tradi-
tional ACP suppliers.  Therefore, duty-free treatment of imports
in excess of an individual ACP state’s pre-1991 best-ever export
volumes was not required by Protocol 5 of the Lomé Conven-
tion.81  Absent any other applicable requirement of the Lomé
Convention, those excess volumes were not covered by the Lomé
waiver and the preferential tariff thereon was therefore inconsis-
tent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994.
GATT 1994, supra note 11, at art. XIII:2(d).  The Article 21.5 panel found that 1994–1996 could
not serve as a representative period because of the presence in the banana market of the fol-
lowing distortions:
With the introduction of the common market organization for bananas in mid-1993, we
note traditional ACP supplier countries were guaranteed country-specific allocations
at pre-1991 best-ever import levels, which were far beyond their actual trade perform-
ance in the recent past.  As of 1995, the Banana Framework Agreement (BFA) allo-
cated shares of the 2,200,000 tonne tariff quota established by Regulation 404/93 to the
substantial suppliers Colombia and Costa Rica.  Given the distortions in the EC mar-
ket prior to the BFA, the shares assigned to Colombia and Costa Rica could not have
been based on a previous representative period.  Moreover, the BFA contained WTO-
inconsistent rules concerning the export certificate requirements and re-allocations of
unused portions of country-specific allocations exclusively among BFA signatories,
which further aggravated such distortions.  The shares of non-traditional ACP supplier
countries were also distorted because of the country-specific allocations within the
quantity of 90,000 tonnes that were reserved for non-traditional ACP suppliers.
Art. 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 73, ¶ 6.43.
79. Art. 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 73, ¶ 6.50.
80. Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M.
783 (1990).  In 1994, the WTO General Council granted a waiver to the EC from is obligations
under Article I:1 GATT to allow the EC preferential treatment provided for products originat-
ing in ACP states.  This decision is known as the Lomé waiver.  The Fourth ACP-EEC Conven-
tion of Lomé: Extension of Waiver, Decision of 14 October 1996, WT/L/186 (Oct. 18, 1996),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
81. The Article 21.5 panel referred to the Appellate Body’s conclusion in EC–Bananas that
the EC is required under the Lomé Convention to “allocate tariff quota shares to the traditional
ACP States that supplied bananas to the European Communities before 1991 in the amount of
their pre-1991 best-ever export volumes.”  Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, ¶ 178.  The
Article 21.5 panel continued:
In our view, the Appellate Body’s choice of the plural in this sentence indicates that
the requirements of the Lomé Convention refer to country-specific pre-1991 best-ever
volumes.  To put it differently, Protocol 5 to the Lomé Convention does not “require”
the European Communities to allow certain traditional ACP suppliers to exceed their
individual pre-1991 best-ever import quantity within the “collective” allocation of
857,700 tonnes reserved for all traditional ACP suppliers under the revised regime.
Art. 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 73, ¶ 6.67.
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When EC–Bananas–Article 21.5 Panel was adopted by the DSB,
OGT had already commenced proceedings in the German courts
against the German authorities concerning the levying of a customs
duty on the importation of bananas from Ecuador.  In January 1999,
OGT imported 43.01 tons of bananas from Ecuador.  The German
authorities applied the third-country import duty of EUR 75 per ton
under Council Regulation 404/9382 and OGT paid the amount due.
However, OGT then appealed the duty assessment to the German
courts and applied for a suspension of its enforcement.
When the case came to trial, the German court was referred to
the decision in EC–Bananas–Article 21.5 Panel.  It considered that
EC–Bananas–Article 21.5 Panel, subject to the issue of direct effect,
could mean that the revised EC banana import regime was unlawful.
It therefore referred OGT to the E.C.J. on a question of EC law83 and
asked the E.C.J. whether OGT could rely on GATT 1994 Articles I
and XIII to challenge the validity of the duty set by Council Regula-
tion 404/93.  The E.C.J. characterized the question as whether Arti-
cles I and XIII of GATT 1994 had direct effect in the EC legal or-
der.84  It ruled that the answer to this question “may be clearly
deduced from existing case-law,” enabling the E.C.J. to give its deci-
sion by “reasoned order” under Article 104(3) of its Rules of Proce-
dure.85  Accordingly, the E.C.J. cited Portugal v. Council86 and Dior
and Others87 (where Portugal v. Council was applied so as to deny di-
rect effect to the provisions of TRIPS), and stated that “[i]t follows
that the same must apply, for the same reasons, to the provisions of
GATT 1994.”88
82. Council Regulation 404/93, supra note 16.
83. Article 234 (ex Article 177) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community reads:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a)
the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the insti-
tutions of the [EC] . . . . Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of
a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the ques-
tion is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a
ruling thereon.  Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 48, at art. 234 (ex art. 177).
84. Case C-307/99, OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St.
Annen (2001), ¶ 22, available at http://curia.eu.int/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
85. Id. ¶ 23.
86. Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395.
87. Joined Cases C-300/98 & C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Tuk Consultancy BV
E.C.J. (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
88. OGT, Case C-307/99 at 6, ¶ 26.
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As for the application of the Nakajima89 and Fediol90 exceptions,
the E.C.J. ruled that Council Regulation 404/93 as amended was “not
designed to ensure the implementation in the EC legal order of a par-
ticular obligation assumed in the context of GATT, nor does it refer
expressly to specific provisions of GATT.”91  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the E.C.J. appears to have dismissed the fact that the preamble
to Council Regulation 1637/98, which amended Council Regulation
404/93, stated that “the [EC]’s international commitments under the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) . . . should be met.”92
In addition, OGT argued that the first paragraph of Article 307
(ex Article 234) EC applied to GATT 1994 and that this provision
could give GATT 1994 direct effect.  The first paragraph of Article
307 (ex Article 234) EC reads:
The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded be-
fore 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their
accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand,
and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected
by the provisions of this Treaty.93
In addressing this argument, the E.C.J. was prepared to assume that
GATT 1994 was an agreement within the scope of the paragraph.94
However, the E.C.J. correctly stated that GATT 1994 is legally dis-
tinct from GATT 1947 under Article II:4 of the WTO Agreement,
that it differs significantly from GATT 1947 as part of the overall
WTO regime, and was concluded by the EC, and not by the Member
States.95
Even under the assumption that GATT is within the scope of Ar-
ticle 307 (ex Article 234), the E.C.J. referred to the judgment in Bu-
89. Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council 1991 E.C.R. I-2096.
90. Case 70/87, Fédération de l’industrie de l’huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission
1989 E.C.R. 1781.
91. Id.
92. Council Regulation 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 Amending Council Regulation 404/93 on
the Common Organisation of the Market in Bananas, 1998 O.J. (L 210) 28.
93. Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 48, at art. 307 (ex art. 234),
para. 1.
94. OGT, Case C-307/99 at 6, ¶ 29.
95. See Opinion 1/94 of the Court of 15 November 1994.  Competence of the Community
to Conclude International Agreements Concerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual
Property, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267 (point 1 of the operative part).  In this context, it is also difficult to
see how OGT could successfully argue that GATT 1947 could be given direct effect without un-
dermining the E.C.J.’s existing case law, which consistently denied individuals and Member
States the general right to rely on its provisions.  See, e.g., Case 21/72, Int’l Fruit Co. NV v. Pro-
duktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219; Case C-280/93, Fed. Republic of Germany
v. Council of the European Communities, 1994 E.C.R. I-4973.
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roga96 in which it held that agreements to which Article 307 (ex Arti-
cle 234) EC applies do not become part of EC law, and do not create
new rights for individuals or economic operators.  If a national of a
Member State could not claim rights under the agreement before the
EC Treaty entered into force for the Member State, he or she can not
derive any such rights by virtue of Article 307 (ex Article 234) EC.97
However, the E.C.J. did not expressly apply Buroga in detail to
OGT, and instead repeated the essential findings described above.
Nevertheless, one can interpret the E.C.J.’s implicit reasoning to be
that since GATT 1994 has no direct effect in itself, Article 307 (ex Ar-
ticle 234) EC could not alter its legal status in EC law.98  The E.C.J.
thus concluded that
[t]he answer to the question referred must therefore be that Arti-
cles I and XIII of GATT 1994 are not such as to create rights which
individuals may rely on directly before a national court in order to
oppose the application of the second subparagraph of Article 18(1)
of Regulation 404/93, as amended by Regulation 1637/98.99
IV.  COMMENTS
The Banana Cases raise the issue of whether an adopted dispute
settlement report creates a specific and binding obligation on the EC
to bring its measures into conformity with WTO rules.  If the report
does create such a specific obligation, a further question arises as to
whether such an obligation can create directly effective rights in the
EC legal order. As is explained in the following discussion, Portugal
v. Council itself implicitly resolves these two issues.  The Banana
96. Case 812/79, Attorney Gen. v. Buroga, 1980 E.C.R. 2787 ¶ 10.
97. MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 8, at 229–30.
98. The analysis in OGT of Article 307 (ex Article 234) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community has been taken further in Case T-2/99, T Port GmbH & Co. KG v. Coun-
cil of the European Communities (2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2001) [hereinafter T Port II] and Case T-3/99, Bananatrading GmbH v. Council of the European
Communities (2001), available at http://europa.eu.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).  First, in both
cases, the C.F.I. found that GATT 1994 was legally distinct from GATT 1947 and was therefore
not within the scope of the Article (T Port II, Case T-2/99, ¶¶ 79–81; Bananatrading, Case T-
3/99, ¶¶ 73–77).  Second, the obligations arising from GATT 1994 fell on the Community and
not the Member States (T Port II, Case T-2/99, ¶ 82; Bananatrading, Case T-3/99, ¶ 76).  Third,
Article 307 (ex Article 234) was not intended to confer rights on individuals and therefore its
alleged breach could not be a separate ground for claiming damages (T Port II, Case T-2/99 ¶¶
83–84; Bananatrading, Case T-3/99, ¶¶ 78–79).  Finally, any argument that Article 307 (ex Arti-
cle 234) gave GATT 1994 direct effect was inconsistent with existing case law on the issue (T
Port II, Case T-2/99, ¶ 85; Bananatrading, Case T-3/99, ¶ 80).
99. OGT, Case C-307/99, ¶ 31.
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Cases can therefore be interpreted as a logical application of the
E.C.J.’s reasoning in Portugal v. Council.
A. Existence of the Obligation of Conformity
In deciding whether the WTO Agreement mandated the manner
and form of its implementation, the E.C.J. noted in Portugal v. Coun-
cil that the main purpose of the DSU was “to secure the withdrawal
of . . . measures . . . found to be inconsistent with the WTO rules.”100
In addition, the E.C.J. held that Article 22.1 of the DSU on compen-
sation and retaliation “shows a preference for full implementation of
a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the WTO
agreements in question.”101  Thus, the E.C.J., expressly recognized
that, in the words of Jackson, “an adopted dispute settlement report
establishes an international law obligation upon the Member in ques-
tion to change its practice to make it consistent with the rules of the
WTO Agreement and its annexes.”102
B. Content of the Obligation of Conformity
Although Jackson has correctly identified the existence of the
“obligation of conformity,” it is necessary to inquire further and de-
termine the precise content of that obligation.  Does the obligation re-
quire WTO members to achieve full consistency between their im-
pugned measures and the WTO Agreement?  Or is the duty less
stringent?  Can WTO members fulfil the obligation by an alternative
course of conduct?
The content of the “obligation of conformity” can be discerned
from both the wording and structure of the DSU.  As to its wording,
Article 3.7 speaks of compensation being “resorted to” only if the
immediate withdrawal of the offending measure is impracticable, and
of retaliation as “the last resort.”  In addition, DSU Article 22.1 states
that “neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or
other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a recommen-
dation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agree-
100. Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, ¶ 37.
101. Id. ¶ 38.
102. John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings of
the Nature of Legal Obligation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION 69, 70 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998); cf. Judith H. Bello, The
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 416 (1996); Timothy.
M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal, Revenge of the Push-Me Pull-You: the Implementation Process
Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 32 INT’L LAW. 755 (1998).
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ments.”103  The implication of these provisions is that the DSU
“clearly establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the rec-
ommendation.”104  Indeed, the above quotation from Portugal v.
Council indicates the identical conclusion of the E.C.J.  In this regard,
one must remember that although full conformity with DSB rulings is
the favored course of action under the DSU, it is not the sole route of
implementation legitimately available to WTO members.  Thus, one
must also consider the structure of the DSU.  Where a WTO member
fails to achieve conformity within a reasonable period of time,105 the
DSU provides for the possibility of that WTO member entering into
temporary Article 22 arrangements in lieu of full implementation.
Consequently, the above factors indicate that the content of the
obligation of conformity is “soft.”  That is to say, a WTO member is
obligated at least to attempt to bring its measures into conformity with
WTO rules.  A WTO member cannot simply ignore the recommenda-
tions of the DSB.  Nevertheless, a WTO member’s failure to achieve
conformity within the relevant time limits does not mean that it has
breached its international obligations, as it has the option of entering
into temporary Article 22 arrangements in lieu of full implementa-
tion.106  This is not to say that the WTO member’s substantive breach
of WTO rules will be “absolved” by the activation of Article 22.  The
DSB’s ruling that the member is in breach cannot be retrospectively
“annulled” by the dispute settlement parties’ choice to agree on com-
pensation or to implement retaliation.  Rather, the argument set forth
here is that the secondary obligation of bringing the offending meas-
ure back into conformity with the WTO Agreement can be fulfilled
103. DSU, supra note 74, at art. 22.1 (emphasis added).
104. Jackson, supra note 102, at 74.
105. This determination must be made pursuant to Article 21.3.  See DSU, supra note 74, at
art. 21.3.
106. See Desmedt, supra note 7, at 100; see also Griller, supra note 7, at 450–54; Rosas, supra
note 7, at 809; Zonnekeyn, supra note 7, at 300–02.  The obligation of conformity will only be
breached where the WTO member makes it clear that it has no intention of implementing an
adopted report for whatever reason.  The view expressed in the text is confirmed to a significant
degree by EC practice.  Council Regulation 1515/2001 on the Measures That May Be Taken by
the Community Following a Report Adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Concern-
ing Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 201) 10 (Recital 4 of its preamble
provides that the EC may bring its anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures into conformity with
DSB recommendations and rulings “where it considers this appropriate”).  In addition, the ex-
planatory memorandum to the Commission proposal for the Regulation states clearly that
“WTO rules do not oblige the Community to implement a report adopted by the DSB.”  See
Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Measures that may be Taken by the
Community Following a Report Adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Concerning
Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Measures, 2001 O.J. (C 270 E) 242.
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by an attempt to perform the obligation, rather than a complete per-
formance.
The E.C.J. implicitly recognized this limitation on the obligation
of conformity when setting out the justification for its decision in
Portugal v. Council, which appears at two separate points of the
judgment:
40. Consequently, to require the judicial organs to refrain from ap-
plying the rules of domestic law which are inconsistent with the
WTO agreements would have the consequence of depriving the
legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties of the pos-
sibility afforded by Article 22 of [the DSU] of entering into negoti-
ated arrangements even on a temporary basis . . . .
46. To accept that the role of ensuring that [WTO] rules comply
with Community law devolves directly on the [EC] judicature
would deprive the legislative or executive organs of the [EC] of the
scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by the counterparts in the [EC]’s
trading partners.107
In other words, the E.C.J. sought to ensure that the EC was on a
‘level playing field’ with other WTO members that had not given the
WTO Agreement direct effect.  The remedial consequences of direct
effect in the EC legal order (i.e., disapplication of the impugned EC
measure) could unilaterally restrict the EC’s ability to maintain in-
fringing measures through temporary compensation arrangements.
In contrast, those political institutions of other WTO members whose
actions were not subject to such judicial scrutiny would have a full
ability to enter into compensation arrangements (or accept retalia-
tion), while simultaneously maintaining their own measures that were
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement.108  The E.C.J.’s concern not to
undermine the EC’s right to enter into compensation arrangements
was based on an appreciation of the fact that the EC was not bound
to achieve full implementation by the obligation of conformity.  The
EC still had the right to enter into Article 22 arrangements, albeit in
tandem with a soft obligation to attempt to comply with the DSB
ruling.
Moreover, the E.C.J.’s reasoning in Portugal v. Council appears
to have assumed the existence of an adopted dispute settlement re-
port.  The E.C.J.’s focus on compensation presupposes the adoption
of “the panel or Appellate Body report” which activates the imple-
mentation procedures under DSU Article 21.  This assumption re-
futes the argument of those commentators who previously suggested
107. Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, ¶¶ 40, 46.
108. See Griller, supra note 7, at 455; see also Zonnekeyn, supra note 7, at 299.
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that while it may be generally problematic to give direct effect to the
WTO Agreement per se, one could envisage giving direct effect to
rulings of the DSB.  As Rosas states, the forms of implementation
mentioned in DSU Article 22 (compensation, suspension of conces-
sions, amicable settlement) “apply precisely when there has been a
determination of non-compliance by the dispute settlement organs.”109
This analysis has been confirmed by all the Banana Cases discussed in
this Article.  The fact that both the Appellate Body and Article 21.5
reports confirmed that the EC was in breach of certain provisions of
the WTO Agreement did not alter the EC Courts’ conclusion that
those provisions could not be given direct effect.  In conclusion, the
EC Courts have correctly ruled in Portugal v. Council and the Banana
Cases that the legal status of an adopted dispute settlement report
does not oblige the EC to achieve full implementation of its recom-
mendations where the possibility of temporary compensation and re-
taliation exists.  The obligation is for the EC to attempt to implement
an adopted report within a reasonable period of time.
C. Direct Effect of the Obligation of Conformity?
The EC Courts were correct to rule in the Banana Cases that the
“soft” obligation of conformity cannot have direct effect in EC law
for the following reasons.  Despite its analysis in Portugal v. Council,
109. See Rosas, supra note 7, at 811.  The E.C.J. in Portugal v. Council, however, did not
consider the impact of the still unsettled “sequencing” issue, which was the subject of intense
debate in the DSB during the implementation of EC–Bananas.  In essence, the sequencing issue
is whether a DSU Article 21.5 panel report to the effect that a WTO member has not correctly
implemented an “original” dispute settlement report must be obtained before Article 22 proce-
dures can be activated.  Nevertheless, the resolution of the sequencing issue would have no ef-
fect on the outcome of Portugal v. Council or the Banana Cases.  The sequencing issue concerns
the point at which Article 22 procedures can be validly commenced.  Nevertheless, after the
adoption of either the original report(s) or the Article 21.5 report(s), the possibility of Article 22
arrangements still exists.  As has been seen above, this possibility is enough to limit the content
of the obligation of conformity, so that the EC is only under a soft obligation to attempt full im-
plementation after the adoption of any dispute settlement report.  It is hoped that the sequenc-
ing issue will be addressed in the DSU review, which is due to be reactivated after the 2001
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar.  See WTO Dispute Settlement Body Minutes of Meet-
ing held January 25–February 1, 1999, WT/DSB/M/54 (Apr. 20, 1999); see also WTO Dispute
Settlement Body Panel Report on EC Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas—Recourse to Article 22.2 of the DSU by the United States—Communication from Ja-
pan, WT/DSB/W/91 (Jan. 25, 1999) (stating that when there is a disagreement on measures
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the panel and the Appellate Body,
“the prevailing parties may not resort to Article 22 procedures for compensation or the suspen-
sion of concessions or other obligations before the disagreement is settled through the proce-
dure laid down in Article 21.5 of the DSU”) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law).
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the E.C.J. has held that to determine whether a rule in an interna-
tional agreement has direct effect, it is necessary first to ascertain
whether the content of that rule is clear, precise, and unconditional,
and then to evaluate the content in light of the aims and context of
the agreement.110  The obligation of conformity does not fulfil this
two-limb test for direct effect.
As regards the first limb of the test, the obligation of conformity
cannot be classified as clear or precise.  As to clarity and precision,
Jackson admits that the language of the DSU does not solidly “nail
down” what the legal effect of a DSU report should be.111  Indeed, he
discerns the existence of the obligation of conformity from the cu-
mulative effect of at least eleven DSU provisions.112  Accordingly, it is
impossible to identify a stand-alone provision in the DSU which gives
a definitive legal basis for the obligation of conformity.
As for the second limb of the test, do the aims and context of the
WTO Agreement support a finding that the obligation of conformity
can be relied upon in EC Courts?  In answering this question, two
points can be made.  First, the E.C.J. in Portugal v. Council was mis-
taken in characterizing the WTO Agreement as founded, like GATT
1947, on negotiations with a view to “reciprocal and mutually advan-
tageous arrangements.”113  However, the structure of the DSU and the
wording of Article 22 taken together suggest that the aims and con-
text of the WTO Agreement require the E.C.J. to refrain from scruti-
nizing EC legislation in the light of WTO rules.
As to the characterization of the WTO Agreement as reciprocal
and mutually advantageous, Advocate General Saggio states, in his
Opinion to Portugal v. Council:
It must be recognised that many provisions of the agreements at-
tached to the Agreement establishing the WTO give rise to obliga-
tions and prohibitions that are unconditional and include specific
undertakings for commitments by the contracting parties in the
context of their reciprocal relations . . . .
110. See, e.g., Case 87/75, Bresciani Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, 1976 E.C.R.
129, ¶ 16; Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329, ¶ 14 et
seq.; Case 17/81, Pabst & Richarz AG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 1982 E.C.R. 1331, ¶¶ 26–27;
Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C A Kupferberg & Cie KG aA, 1982 E.C.R. 3641, ¶¶ 11–
14, 23; Case 12/86, Demirel (Meryem) v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, ¶ 14; Case
192/89, Sevince v. Staatssecreatris van Justitie, 1990 E.C.R. I-3461, ¶ 15; Case C-18/90, Office
nat’l de l’emploi v. Bahia Kziber, 1991 E.C.R. I-199, ¶ 15; Case C-432/92, The Queen v. Minister
of Agric., Fisheries and Food, ex parte S P Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd., 1994 E.C.R. I-3087.
111. Jackson, supra note 102, at 72.
112. DSU, supra note 74, at arts. 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 11, 19.1, 21.1, 21.6, 22.1, 22.2, 22.8, 26.1(b).
113. Portugal, Case C-149/96, ¶ 42.
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[A]nd it has rightly been held that the present system gives little
latitude to States who believe they are victims of illegal conduct on
the part of another contracting party.114
Advocate General Saggio’s analysis is preferable to that of the
E.C.J., particularly when one considers that it is difficult to charac-
terize an international agreement possessing a compulsory dispute
settlement procedure as inherently flexible and founded on negotia-
tion.115  Further, the E.C.J.’s characterization led it to draw an uncom-
fortable distinction between the WTO Agreement and “agreements
concluded between the [EC] and non-member countries which intro-
duce a certain asymmetry of obligations, or create special relations of
integration with the [EC],” the latter having been given direct ef-
fect.116  As Griller notes, the E.C.J. drew no clear borderline between
“asymmetric” and “reciprocal and mutually advantageous” agree-
ments.117  In addition, it is even more difficult to apply these simple
labels to complex international trade agreements in which commit-
ments may appear to be evenly balanced, but in fact are asymmetric
when implemented to the relevant markets.  For example, economic
opportunities for the vast majority of WTO members in the EC mar-
ket are much greater than could be offered to the EC in return.118
However, as to the structure and wording of the DSU, the E.C.J.
correctly concluded that judicial scrutiny and potential disapplication
of measures, which the EC is entitled to maintain temporarily under
Article 22, would both frustrate the EC’s express rights under the
WTO Agreement and unilaterally disadvantage the EC vis-à-vis for-
eign governments who are not under equivalent restraints.  There-
fore, the express wording of Article 22 and the structure of the DSU
as a whole indicate that the direct effect of WTO rules would run
counter to the permissive “aims and context” of the WTO dispute set-
tlement system.119  Thus, the obligation of conformity also fails the
second limb of the direct effect test.
Finally, the lack of certainty, precision, and unconditionality in
the obligation of conformity also leads one to conclude that it cannot
114. Id. ¶ 21.
115. See Desmedt, supra note 7, at 98; see also Griller, supra note 7, at 457; Rosas, supra
note 7, at 808; Zonnekeyn, supra note 7, at 300.
116. Portugal, Case C-149/96, ¶ 42.  An example of an “asymmetric” agreement was held to
be the EEC-Portugal Free Trade Agreement, given direct effect in Hauptzollamt, Case 104/81.
117. See Griller, supra note 7, at 459; see also Rosas, supra note 7, at 813.
118. See Griller, supra note 7, at 458.
119. Rosas, supra note 7, at 811.
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be brought within the Nakajima120 exception to Portugal v. Council.
Although the scope of the Nakajima exception has yet to be fully
clarified,121 Nakajima itself was concerned with the situation where
the EC stated its intention to implement a precise GATT 1947 Anti-
Dumping Code provision (i.e., Article VI of the Code).122  Advocate
General Saggio recognized in Portugal v. Council that Nakajima was
“more consistent with the general case-law on international agree-
ments and is based on different criteria from those used to evaluate
the effects of the GATT with regard to [EC] legislation.”123  That is to
say, Article VI of the Code was implicitly considered clear, precise,
and unconditional.  It is therefore suggested that the Nakajima excep-
tion ultimately requires an application of the first limb of the direct
effect test referred to above.  As can be seen from OGT, it is not
enough for the EC legislation to identify the EC’s general obligation
to conform to WTO rules.  The legal compulsion for the relevant EC
measure must be a clear, precise, and unconditional provision in the
WTO Agreement.  Consequently, the lack of precision and condi-
tional nature of the obligation of conformity means that the EC
Courts were correct to hold in the Banana Cases that it is not a “par-
ticular obligation”124 of the WTO Agreement, as that term is under-
stood in EC law.
V.  CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to show that WTO members are only un-
der a “soft” international obligation to bring unlawful measures into
conformity with the WTO Agreement. That obligation of conformity
only requires a WTO member to attempt to achieve consistency be-
tween its laws and the WTO Agreement after the adoption of an un-
favorable dispute settlement report.  Failure to achieve consistency
does not constitute a breach of international law, as the WTO
Agreement expressly permits the recalcitrant member to engage in
temporary Article 22 procedures while maintaining the offending
measures.  This argument has been implicitly confirmed by the EC
Courts in the Banana Cases.
120. Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council 1991 E.C.R. I-2096.
121. See Griller, supra note 7, at 463–67; see also Rosas, supra note 7, at 815.
122. Nakajima, Case C-69/89, ¶ 30; see Case C-280/93, Fed. Republic of Germany v. Council
of the European Communities, 1994 E.C.R. I-4973, Op. Advocate Gen., ¶¶ 145–51.
123. Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395, ¶ 21.
124. OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen (2001), ¶¶
22, 27, available at http://curia.eu.int/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
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Further, by recognizing the soft nature of the obligation of con-
formity, the EC Courts rightly concluded that it cannot be given di-
rect effect in the EC legal order.  This is because the obligation is nei-
ther clear nor precise.  Further, the WTO Agreement, and in
particular, DSU Article 22, allows the EC to maintain temporary
measures which breach WTO rules.  Giving general direct effect to
the WTO Agreement would allow the EC Courts to disapply EC
measures which contravene the Agreement, thus undermining the
EC’s express rights under international law.
